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SHORT-TERM RENTAL REGULATION AND HOUSE SHARING
BEHAVIOR : EVIDENCE FROM AIRBNB.COM
Huang Yuxin
National University of Singapore

Tan Chuan Hoo
National University of Singapore

Chen Yuanyuan
The University of Alabama

Abstract
The controversial short-term rental (STR) industry and the relevant STR regulation have been
in the spotlight in recent years. Despite all the pros and cons of regulating the STR industry,
yet it is unclear what the real effects of the STR regulation are. This study seeks to shed light
on the questions regarding how the city STR regulation and should be conceived as well as
what the outcomes of the regulation implementation are. We employ a comprehensive data set
assembled from multiple resources to analyze the effects of the STR regulation from different
geographic levels. Indeed, STR regulation turns out to be effective in improving the STR
business. Registration requirement would encourage people from affluent neighborhoods to
list their properties online. And internal requirements of the listed properties are critical in
preventing listings from those non-affluent neighborhoods. At the clause level, the clauses
vary in their effects in different types of neighborhoods. The clause specifically requiring
listing to achieve certain standards would be more efficient in crowding out the listings with
low quality from the STR market. STR regulation would be able to raise the quality of the
listings online and standardize the listing process. Consequently, STR regulation would
reduce the information-based uncertainties exist in the online STR mediatory platforms.
Overall, the results suggest that STR regulation helps release the “lemon problems” in the
STR market by encouraging listings with good quality while crowd out the “bad apples” from
the platforms by adjusting the STR business in different types of neighborhoods.
Keywords:
Sharing economy; short-term rental; Airbnb; regulation

1. Introduction
As a prominent platform for Internet-based short-term rental (STR), Airbnb.com matches
homeowners (thereafter term as hosts) with slack housing resources to individuals (thereafter
term as customers) who need STR 1 . The hosts could make efficient use of vacant
accommodation units or rooms by renting them out for a short time, thereby translating slack,
unutilized resources into economic returns. The STR hosts could make efficient use of the
vacant accommodation units or rooms by renting them out for a short period of time, thereby
translating slack, unutilized resources into economic returns.
While seemingly beneficial, STR is fast drawn legislation attention on whether the
increasingly active business operation should be regulated. Cities like New York, San
Francisco have imposed or contemplating to impose regulation to legalize the STR business.
1
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The real estate owners in New York argued that STR is supposed to be functioning as a free
market where they should have the freedom to rent out rooms at their own will. Real estate
owners and proponents for sharing economy tout that sharing economy would be able to
adjust the market through the market dynamism. However, the city governments caution that
there could be quality heterogeneity among the individual-hosted accommodation and there is
a need to better protect the customers. Indeed, it is not uncommon for customers to complain
about the quality of the STR service, which is different than what the properties appear to be
on the platform2, and doubts on the reliability of the hosts. The question is then whether STR
needs to be regulated. In other words, does regulation serve as a key impediment (or enabler)
to the accommodation listing in Airbnb.com? This study, hence, seeks to empirically study
STR regulation from the law and economics perspective in a technology-enabled platform
like Airbnb.com with the following questions: 1) What is the overarching consequence of
imposing STR regulations on the STR business? 2) Would the business impact of the STR
regulation vary across different types of neighborhoods within a city?
By answering these questions, this study could shed light on whether the government should
impose STR regulation and how such regulation should be conceived (i.e., the regulation
clauses to consider). Measuring the consequence of STR regulation based on accommodation
listing, as reflected by new listing and delisting of real estate posts in Airbnb.com, is able to
reflect the change in the Airbnb supply. This measure accords to the Zervas et al. (2014) who
use the number of listing as important indicators of the Airbnb supply. Our quest to answer
the above question extends to the inquiry of the consequences of specific clauses in STR
regulation (granularity in insight) and the varying neighborhood type (robustness in finding).
Our study would be able to contribute in several ways: First, this study adds to the literature
on the STR and STR regulation by examining how the STR regulation would affect the online
STR business. The controversial STR regulation has attracted attention from different parties.
Regulation is supposed to be evaluated by the outcomes. Through the empirical analysis
based on a longitudinal panel research design, we provide empirical support that the STR
regulation could the raise the quality of the listing on the platform by encouraging listings
with good quality to list online and prevent underqualified properties to list on the online
platform. In addition, we evaluate the effects of the STR regulation in multiple geographic
levels including the city-level general effects as well as the neighborhood level effects. The
results show that the same regulation does vary in its effects on different types of
neighborhoods: hosts from the affluent neighborhoods are encouraged to participate in house
sharing activities compared to those from non-affluent neighborhoods. Second, the study
would add to the literature in the law and economics by providing empirical evidence on how
the regulation would be able to help prevent market failure. Information asymmetry in the
online platform might lower the customers’ willingness to conduct transactions (Thierer et al.
2015). However, STR regulation specified the requirements for the hosts including the safety
and health facilities in the apartment which would ensure that the listings online have reached
certain standards. After going through the legal process from registration to equip with
relevant facilities in the rooms, the remained listings are those that have reached certain levels
of quality. As a result, the overall quality of the listings on the platform could be improved.
Standardization of the STR listings turns out to be useful in releasing the “lemon problem” in
the STR market. Practically, the study would help city government in STR regulation
implementation decisions by evaluating the effects of the STR at the clause-level. City
governments are responsible for STR regulation implementation and they often went through
multiple meetings to discuss the brewing debate on short-term rental regulation. We identify
2
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two perspectives of STR regulation that would be useful in improving the average quality of
the listings on the platform (i.e. registration and internal requirements). Though the clauses
could vary in their effects, the city governments can require the hosts to go through the
registration process at the beginning and ensure their properties have equipped with safety and
health facilities to protect the customers’ safety during their stay. In the regulated
environment, properties with higher quality are more willing to list online and unqualified
listings are prevented from the market. Consequently, the government is likely to witness
improvement on the average listing quality.

2. Literature and Theory
2.1 Sharing economy and STR business
Previous studies in sharing economy emphasize the phenomena itself as well as its effects
including the economic consequences and the social impact of the sharing activities. For
instance, found that the important drivers for people’s participation in the sharing activities
involve sustainability, enjoyment and economic gains. In STR business, they suggest that the
monetary benefit is the main driver in the STR business. STR business is suggested to be able
to create opportunities for the local residents to earn monetary benefits and contribute to local
wealth. It helps spread tourist dollars beyond typical hotel and tourism districts. In addition, it
offers both tourists and property owners with valuable social and cultural exchange. However,
the benefits of STR activities are inevitably accompanied by concerns. For instance, it could
aggravate the racial discrimination online for the hosts and the customers. From the customer
perspective, the quality of STR service is uncertain without proper standards compared to the
traditional branded hotels. Services of sharing economy are often described as
“deprofessional” especially compared to the professional hotel services. The
“deprofessionalization” is likely to raise concerns regarding the customer protection. The
problem of uncertainty in online transactions could become obstacles to the prosperity of
online business requiring the city government to take corresponding measures.
2.2 Information asymmetry and customer protection
It is recognized that the primary motive for discussing STR regulation is not to discourage the
flourish of it but to institutionalize checks and balances so that STR could grow and the “bad
lemons” in the market could be crowded out from the market. The issue of lemons is rooted in
the classical economic problem of information asymmetry, which occurs when one party
lacks important information that the dealing party withholds. For instance, the host would
provide description and photos about their properties from which the customers get to know
about the listing. Customers are only able to evaluate the condition of the listings through the
provided information. Thus, the goal of the legislation is to ensure the hosts provide the
properties as they are described online and avoid misleading actions to protect customers from
unfair, inaccurate and deceptive trade practices conducted by the hosts. Relating to the STR
accommodation, this would typically represent as habitability warranty, that is, the hosts are
required to provide housing with fundamental services (e.g., basic facilities such as heating
mentioned earlier) to the guests. And customers have the rights to require the facilities and
services to be delivered as the ways they are expected and required replacement or repairment
if necessary. To the issue of information asymmetry, STR regulation could achieve customer
protection by restricting the source of the STR listings and standardizing the listing quality.
The government could restrict the source of STR listings and require the listing to reach
certain standards if the hosts wish to list their properties for STR. From the other hand,
listings with permission could signal the prospective customers that they are qualified listings

for STR business: the listings are well recorded by the official department and they are
equipped with necessary facilities to ensure the safety of the customers.

3. Data and Method
We collected the data from multiple sources. We first identified the cities that have legislation
regulating STR from the Airbnb official website and market research reports. Airbnb provides
a summary of the city-level STR ordinances across the world on their website. The
RoomScore Report published by the R Street Institute evaluates different cities’ existing STR
legal framework of STR and grades the cities according to the STR legal framework in the
United States3. Based on the two sources of regulation summary, we identified 15 cities in
U.S. that have passed and implemented STR regulation in November 2014 - November 2016
(Appendix A provides the information of 15 cities). We then downloaded these cities STR
laws from the city governments’ websites, and content analyzed the clauses that focus on
consumer protection. We identify two important perspectives of the STR regulations related
to consumer protection: requirement for property registration (i.e., registration) and
requirements for the properties to equip with necessary facilities (i.e., internal requirements)
as shown in Table 1.
We used the Airbnb data to calculate two dependent variables: the number of newly listed
properties, and the number of properties delisted in that month. The reason we selected these
two variables as the dependent variable is because in the two-sided platform, the number of
suppliers in the platform is an important indicator of market efficiency in the platform. In our
case, the number of suppliers is related to the number of new listing and the number of
delisting. The STR regulation is supposed to help standardize the STR business and sustain
the development of the STR business including preventing potential market failure. To
achieve the goal, the government only permit the qualified listings to list online and delist the
unqualified ones from the platform which could be reflected by hosts’ listing and delisting
behavior. Thus, both of the measurements are critical when considering the healthy
development of the STR business. The majority of the properties listed on the Airbnb.com are
apartment and houses. Cities allow different types of properties to be listed for the STR
business as long as they live up to the standards required by the STR regulation. Thus, we
consider it as appropriate to consider the different types of listing properties as a whole.
We also control for the city level demographics including household income, vacancy ratio,
household number,ethnic ratio, hotel size, crime rate and airport traffic to control or the
neighborhoods characteristics. Year dummies and month dummies are also incorporated to
control the seasoning effects.
Table 1 Coding Scheme of the STR Regulation

Registration

No
1

2

Internal
3

3

Clauses
Purpose
Whether the regulation requires registration Identify the unit that
or permit for the property
would be used for STR
Collect information of the
hosts
Whether the regulation requires the hosts to To assist with the
include the STR registration or permit enforcement
of
number on all advertisement
registration
Whether the regulation requires the property Keep guests information

Source: http://www.rstreet.org/policy-study/roomscore-2016-short-term-rental-regulation-in-u-s-cities/

Requirements

host to keep records

for
inspection
and
investigation
Whether the regulation requires STR hosts Raise the standards for
to adhere to basic standards for health and STRs and ensure the
safety of their guests or a general liability safety of the guests
insurance to cover the health and safety of
guests

4

4. Data Analysis and Results
We first examined the general effects of STR regulations. Because STR regulations were
enacted and implemented in different time, we used a two-step DID econometric model
following Greenstone and Hanna (2014) to measure the impacts of the STR laws passed in
different time. Compared to the one-step DID model that is commonly adopted in previous
studies, the two-step models is adopted in the study because the STR regulation
implementation date is different from city to city. Thus, the one-step approach would be
difficult to achieve in that it requires the collapse of the data to the group-level. The two-step
models could avoid such problem while achieving the numerically identical to the one-step
procedure. The first step of the two-step econometric model is to estimate the event studystyle equation:
ln Yct      D ,ct   c  t   ln X ct   ct


(1)

Yct is the dependent variables that we used to measure the STR business on the platform.

c

is the city fixed effects accounting for the time-invariant unobserved elements that are likely
to affect the behavior of the hosts on the platform such as the cultural factors.  t is the month
X
fixed effects that control for the seasoning trend of the popularity of the STR activities. ct
incorporate the set of city demographic characteristics and the other control variables that
account for the different characteristics of the cities that might affect the STR business. We
specify all the demographic variables in logarithm since the empirical analyses would fit
better with economic variables in logarithm form (Goh et al. 2012). Following Greenstone
D

and Hanna (2014), we use a vector  ,ct that is composed of dummy variables representing
each month before and after the regulation is implemented. In the month when the regulation

is implemented,  ,ct is set to be 1. Otherwise, it is set to be 0.  is normalized to 0 in the
month that the regulation is implemented. Before the regulation implementation,  equals to –
n (n months before the policy implementation) and n (n months after the policy
implementation). If the city does not have short-term rental regulation, the  would be set as
D



zero. The estimated  measures the average effects of short-term rental regulation in the
time before and after the policy implementation at the time.
The second step of the model has been used to test the mean effects on the change of the new



listing and delisting after the implementation of the regulation. Using the  estimated from
equation (1), equation (2) tests whether the regulation is related to the behavior of the hosts
reflected through the dependent variables:
   0  1 (Regulation)   (2)
Controlling pre-existing time trend

It is likely that there are pre-existing trends before the regulation implementation. For instance,
as the platform is growing more and more popular, there could be an increase in the number
of new listing. To control for the potential time trend, the following model is fitted:
   0  1 (Regulation)   2   (3)
Equation (3) incorporates the variable  to account for a linear time trend. It could help to
adjust the different trend exist predate the short-term rental regulation implementation.
Equation (2) and (3) estimate the average effects of regulation implementation, however, it
has been suggested that the effects of the regulation could vary as the time goes by. It could
be changed over time due to the government taking necessary measures such as checking the
online listings and fine hosts with illegal listings to enforce the regulation. To control for the
changes of regulation effects over time, the following model is estimated:
   0  1 (Regulation)   2   3 (Regulation  )   (4)
In equation (4), the interaction term of Regulation and linear time variable  is added to test
the effects of the regulation evolve over time. We estimated the above equations in Stata 14.
It is shown that on average, the number of new listings is around four times to the number of
delisting in the sampled city. The correlation between the listing and delisting and the city
demographics is within acceptable range. Our dataset measure the new listing and delisting
numbers on the platform are structured as city-monthly level. We structure the data set the
city-month level in that the STR regulation is city-specific and is usually implemented from
certain month. We measure the change at month level because the regulation would become
effective from after some time. Estimation of the changes of the new listings or the delisting
before and after the STR regulation implementation is more suitable compared to another
level of data aggregation.
Table 2 provides the estimated results from equations (2) ~ (4). The first column reports
estimated coefficients from equation (2) reporting the average effects of regulation
implementation on the estimated  . The second column reports the estimated results from
equation (3). Two coefficients are reported: π1 shows the average effects from the
implementation of the regulation after taking into the consideration pre-existing time trend in
the behavior of the hosts. And π2 is the coefficients of the time trend. Column (3) reports the
estimation results including the average effects on the STR business from policy
implementation after accounting for the time trend and a mean shift.
The first dependent variable reported in Table 2 is the number of new listings in each month.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows that there is an increase in the number of new listing on the STR
platform after the implementation of the regulation indicating increasing incentives of the
potential hosts to list their properties on the platform for short-term rental. Taking into
consideration the potential pre-existing time trend, column (2) and column (3) in Table 2
show that there exists an increasing trend that the owners are more likely to list their
properties online for the STR activities after the regulation is implemented. Implementation of
the STRs regulation could prevent some of the unqualified hosts that wish to begin their rental
business at the beginning. However, as the time goes by, the number of new listing would still
increase even after certain kind of properties are prohibited from listed for short-term rental
business.
The second part of Table 2 shows that number of delisting on the platform is also affected by
the implementation of the regulation. It is required that some of the unqualified listings be
removed from the online sharing platform. It is shown in column (1) that implementation of
the regulation would increase the number of delisting properties. However, taking into
consideration the time trend, the number of delisted properties would finally decrease after a

certain period. In the beginning, some of the unqualified listings are removed from the
platform. As the time goes by, the number of delisted properties would decrease. This could
be attributed to the fact that after the regulation implementation, the listings remained on the
platform as well as the newly listed properties are those that satisfy the STR regulation
requirements. And the hosts are more comfortable to list their properties online after they
obtain certification.
To investigate the effects of the clause and the clause category on the STR business, we
implement fixed-effect model to evaluate the effects of the clauses among the cities that have
implemented differences of different clauses and the clause categories identified in Table 1.
lnYit      k ln xik   j (Clause)ij   i   t   it (5)
k

Y is the set of control for the city differences and the zip code level demographics.  i is the
individual differences fixed effects and is the month dummies control for the seasoning
change. The focal variable is the clause and the regulation category and clauses. We fit
equation (5) to evaluate the effects of different clauses on the STR business. It is likely that
these clauses could vary in their effects on the STR business and it is important for the
policymaker to understand what the effective clauses are in regulating STR business. Thus,
the focus of the analysis is to evaluate the effects of the single clause. To study the effects of
the clauses, we constructed the data at the zip code level and separated the sample into by the
types of neighborhood based on the average housing price of the neighborhoods compared to
the city average housing price (Guerrieri et al. 2013). Indeed, the regulation could vary in its
effects on the STR activities in different types of neighborhoods. The reason that we
distinguish the types of neighborhood is that we expect hosts from various neighborhoods
would respond to the STR regulation differently due to the dissimilar conditions in their
properties. In the analyses, we separately analyze the effects of the regulation on these two
subsamples. We merged the housing price data with the Airbnb data and separate the sample
by dividing them into two types of neighborhoods i.e. affluent neighborhoods vs. nonaffluent
neighborhoods by the average housing price (Li and Brown 1980).
Table 3 and Table 4 show the effects of each clause on the STR business. From the results, we
can tell that the effects of the clauses vary in different neighborhoods. The results show that
most of the clauses imposing constraints on the property listed for STR turn out to be able to
encourage people from better neighborhoods to list their properties on the STR platform. In
the meantime, they would prevent properties with lower quality to be listed for STR. For
instance, the clause requiring registration could encourage people to register and list their
properties on the platform. In fact, implementation of the regulation is not prohibiting the
hosts from listing their properties but instead giving out the signal that the city government
allows the STR activities. Cities requiring registration (Clause 1) intend to standardize the
STR industry with proper legal process instead of banning the whole STR business. Thus, the
regulation from the government finally turns out to give out the signal that encourages them
to list their property through the legalized approach. Similarly, requirements for the hosts to
list their license number in the advertisement (Clause 2) could achieve the similar effects.
Requirements for the hosts to keep record has slightly positive effects on the number of new
listing from the affluent neighborhood. And it is negatively related to the number of new
listing from a less affluent neighborhood. The requirement for records keeping (Clause 2) is
an additional operating cost for the hosts. Clause 3 and Clause 4 are more specific clauses in
requiring the hosts to protect the customers’ safety by keeping relevant records and providing
certain safety facilities even insurance. These two clauses would increase the hosts’ operating

costs. As a result, both good neighborhoods and bad neighborhoods are affected by the
clauses reflected by the decrease in the number of new listing. However, the effects are more
significant in the bad neighborhoods. For the hosts from the bad neighborhoods, the concerns
of the upfront costs are more likely to inhibit their willingness to list their properties online.
The clauses would also affect the number of delisting properties differently as shown in Table
4. The clause would increase the number of delisting from the nonaffluent neighborhoods.
Instead, the hosts from the affluent neighborhoods are less likely to drop out the market after
the regulation implementation. After the regulation implementation, it is suggested that the
remained listings are those satisfying the government requirements. After the regulation
giving detailed instruction instructions, they might feel more comfortable to operate their STR
business. In addition, the hosts have to pay for the upfront cost such before they are qualified
to operate. And the increase in the clauses implies an increase in the operating cost. Thus, the
remaining hosts are less likely to withdraw from the market even if the STR regulation is
stricter.

4. Discussion
In summary, this study seeks to contribute to the extant knowledge in three ways: it adds to
the literature in law and economics by providing cornerstone understanding of the economics
of imposing STR regulation. The implication could have bearing on policy-making and offer
indicative suggestions on how policymakers could make sense of digital disruption. The
research provides clarity to the sharing economy and related understanding of it. By
answering the questions, we are able to provide empirical evidence on whether STR
regulation could alleviate the concerns of information-based uncertainty and promote the
overarching sustainability of the sharing economy platform. Rather than just looking at STR
regulation as a whole, we take a granular look at the regulations and identify the clauses in the
regulations that could vary across cities. By doing so, the study could also provide suggestive
guidelines for the city governments and policy-makers on how they could legalize STR
business.
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Table 2 General effect of STR regulation

Dependent Variable
Regulation

(1)
New Listing
0.122***
(0.011)

(2)

(3)

-0.020
(0.015)
0.012***
(0.001)

-0.192***
(0.004)
732
0.136
30
Delisting
0.522***
(0.076)

-0.155***
(0.005)
732
0.319
30

-0.033**
(0.014)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.002)
-0.176***
(0.005)
732
0.384
30

Implementation time
Regulation* Implementation time
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of city
Dependent Variable
Regulation
Implementation time

-0.183*
(0.101)
0.058***
(0.006)

Regulation* Implementation time
Constant

-2.258***
(0.028)
709
0.065
30

Observations
R-squared
Number of city

-2.071***
(0.032)
709
0.182
30

-0.116
(0.099)
0.084***
(0.007)
-0.066***
(0.011)
-1.956***
(0.036)
709
0.227
30

Table 3 Clause-level analysis on new listing

(1)
Affluent

(2)
Non
Affluent

0.454***
(0.065)

-0.006
(0.075)

(3)
Affluent

VARIABLES
Clause1
Clause2

0.003
(0.041)

FE Model
(4)
(5)
Non
Affluent
Affluent
DV=New Listing

(6)
Non
Affluent

0.123
(0.076)

3,193
0.608
152

2,346
0.642
106

-0.152***
(0.033)

0.014
(0.034)

2,346
0.646
106

3,193
0.608
152

-0.169**
(0.083)

Clause4

2,346
0.650
106

(8)
Non
Affluent

-0.196***
(0.042)

Clause3

Observations
R-squared
Number of zipcode

(7)
Affluent

3,193
0.611
152

2,346
0.643
106

3,193
0.609
152

Table 4 Clause-level analysis on delisting

(2)

(3)

(4)

Affluent

Non
Affluent

Affluent

Non
Affluent

VARIABLES
clause1

FE Model
(5)

(1)

Affluent

(6)

(7)

(8)

Non
Affluent

Affluent

Non
Affluent

-0.0752
(0.189)

-0.315***
(0.101)

1,834
0.190
96

2,445
0.146
125

DV=Delisting
-0.380
(0.375)

0.705***
(0.224)

clause2

-0.332**
(0.138)

0.0834
(0.143)

clause3

-0.662*
(0.360)

0.323*
(0.175)

clause4

Observations
R-squared
Number of zipcode

1,834
0.187
96

2,445
0.147
125

1,834
0.179
96

2,445
0.137
125

1,834
0.188
96

2,445
0.144
125

Response Letter
1. Theory: We lends theory foundation from the traditional online platform transactions.
Online transactions are often suggested to accompanied by information asymmetry that could
generate negative effects on the customer welfare protection. In the study, we investigate
whether the STR regulation would achieve one of the goals in customer welfare protection.
We empirically support that the STR regulation could raise the quality of the listing on the
platform by encouraging listings with good quality to list online and prevent underqualified
properties to list on the online platform. To achieve the goal, we identified two perspectives of
short-term regulation that are related to the customer welfare protection including registration
and internal requirements. The reason that we focus on these two categories is that they could
help standardize the STR listings and raise the quality of the listings. Our study would be able
to contribute in several ways: First, this study adds to the literature on the STR and STR
regulation by examining how the STR regulation would affect the online STR business. The
controversial STR regulation has attracted attention from different parties. Regulation is
supposed to be evaluated by the outcomes. Second, the study contributes to the literature in
the law and economics providing empirical evidence on how the regulation would be able to
help prevent market failure. Information asymmetry in the online platform might lower the
customers’ willingness to conduct transactions (Thierer et al. 2015). We found that in the
regulated environment, properties with higher quality are more willing to list online and
unqualified listings are prevented from the market.
2. Methodology and Identification: To illustrate the two-step DID, we divide the models into
several parts. The benefits of the model compared to one-step DID model is that it could take
into consideration the different implementation time in different cities. In addition, the onestep approach would be difficult to achieve in that it requires the collapse of the data to the
group-level. The two-step models could avoid such problem while achieving the numerically
identical to the one-step procedure (Greenstone and Hana, 2014). The first step of the model
is used to estimate the matrix D with the coefficients to be used in the following equation (2)
to (4). Equation (2)-(4) estimate the effects of the regulation on the STR business. To further
control for the time trending, we incorporate the time trend in the model in equation
(3) and equation (4). Thus, our models would be able to examine the effects of regulation.
3. Model: To control for both economic indicators and neighborhoods characteristics. We
consider there are several perspectives of elements that would affect the STR business in the
neighborhoods: the economic status of the neighborhoods (household income, unemployment
rate) and the demographics of the neighborhoods (ethnic ratio, vacancy ratio, household
number). In addition, we also control of the city-level characteristics including the city’s
crime rate and the city’s traveler flow (airport traffic) to control for the demand side effects
on the STR business. Considering that the STR business is related to both demand side and
supply effects, we tried to incorporate the elements from both sides. However, we would
consider taking into consideration the overall economic status such as GDP.
4. Results and discussion: As suggested, we measure the dependent variables as The reason
we selected these two variables as the dependent variable is because in the two-sided platform,
the number of suppliers in the platform is an important indicator of market efficiency in the
platform. In our case, the number of suppliers is related to the number of new listing and the
number of delisting. Thus, we used the two dependent variables to measure the change in the
STR business.
5.Implications: our study would be able to contribute to several streams of literature including
the IS literature. As an internet-mediatory innovation, sharing economy is supported by the

development of Internet. Since the effects of IT-enabled sharing economy on the society is
significant, we are interested in investigating whether government intervention would
effective in adjusting the innovation.

